The books-ʻʻMedical Enhancement and Posthumanityʼʼ (from now on MEP) and ʻʻHuman Enhancementʼʼ (from now on HE)-have many features in common. Both try to present a comprehensive and balanced overview of the ethical debate about biotechnological interventions in humans and both treat the topic essentially from two angles: a theoretical one and an applied one. With this aim they gather 13 (MEP), respectively 18 (HE) scholarly papers from various academic disciplines (mainly by ethicists and philosophers, but they also include a political scientist, a theologian, a legal scholar, and an economist).
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The two books under review tackle the substantial theoretical questions related to the topic: Is any sharp distinction between therapy and enhancement conceptually possible, or convincing? And if so, would this distinction be relevant for the ethical judgment regarding therapeutical or enhancing interventions? Although these questions appear in many of the collected papers, the article ʻʻTherapy, Enhancement and Improvementʼʼ by Ruth Chadwick (in MEP) is particularly helpful. Chadwick shows, with a suggested further distinction between enhancement and improvement, the context-dependency of the terms with which we make our moral judgments. Another important theoretical issue is the question of what constitutes human nature and whether there is any reason to prefer ʻʻthe naturalʼʼ over ʻʻthe non-naturalʼʼ on this matter. Here is a rich playground for fine-grained conceptual clarifications, an opportunity which many contributors have successfully exploited.
Both volumes illustrate the practical challenges and current developments in the wide field of intentionally altering human functioning: attempts to slow the aging process, neuroenhancement by use of psychoactive substances, the selection of traits in oneʼs offspring by genetic testing or engineering, technological devices connected to the human body (particularly the brain) to improve certain functions or to create new ones, but also the ʻʻclassicalʼʼ topics of cosmetic surgery (Mary Devereaux in MEP) and the ʻʻethos of elite sportʼʼ (Torbjörn Tannsjö in HE). Taken together, the two volumes paint a broad picture of the current developments giving rise to the ethical debate, including also some more remote perspectives such as whether we could (and should) enhance our ʻʻtruth orientationʼʼ in a not perfectly convincing article by Robin Hanson (in HE), as well as a brilliant discussion by Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg (in HE) on how we could profit from the evolutionary ʻʻwisdom of natureʼʼ to dif-ferentiate between enhancements which are worth pursuing and those we should stay away from. Both show the ambivalence and ambiguity of any well-considered positions on deeply altering human functioning and both urgently call for an integrative discussion on the possibility to alter human beings. In this sense, both introductions fall somewhat short of the readerʼs justified expectations.
While one would hope for a structured overview and thorough presentation of the field, both introductions restrict themselves to some four brief pages of rather general remarks.
Gordijn/Chadwick point out two charac-teristics of the current debate: Firstly, compared to the debate about improving human beings from the 17 and 18th centuries, with its profound scientific optimism, the contemporary debate about human enhancement takes as a starting point focussing on and questioning medicine as an adequate means of improving human lives. Secondly, the new means at hand allow today for interventions that formerly belonged to the realm of science fiction. Therefore the current debates tackle upcoming problems although they might still seem to be remote. The possibility of posthuman beings-understood as technically improved beings, genetically altered beings or beings not having a human or living body-belongs to such upcoming problems.
In their introduction to HE, Savulescu/Bostrom also state the obvious practical relevance of the biopolitical debate on enhancement and stress the role bioethicists might play in this field. Besides, they also note the important theoretical interest of the debate, connected to several other philosophical disciplines. Nevertheless, they are sceptical regarding whether human enhancements ʻʻconstitute a distinctive cluster of phenomena for which it would be appropriate to have a (multidisciplinary) academic subfieldʼʼ (HE, p. 2).
How we can stretch the term ʻʻenhancementʼʼ (as it seems to cover either too large or too small a terrain) is the subject of much discussion, but the question what specifi-cally is the common core of the multifaceted enhancement debate remains open. One would have expected more than these brief remarks from both introductions, particularly as the books are meant to serve as comprehensive works of reference for the debate.
A few more-minor-critical remarks: Both books could have provided more information about the authors. Applied ethics being an interdisciplinary undertaking, the area of specialisation of the author is interesting for the reader. Whereas in HE it was obviously left to the authors themselves to indicate or not their affiliation in a footnote, any biographical or institutional hints concerning the authors have been thoroughly eliminated in MEP. HE has inconsistent referencing and bibliography and could have been proof read more carefully in some parts. MEP lacks an index (a service which should be included in the price of 159$ per copy).
These minor critiscisms do not affect the fact that both books gather many texts worth reading. And in being read together, the two collections provide a thorough and up-to-date introduction into the multifaceted debate on biotechnical improvements of human functioning. But, is there really something new under the sun? Has any progress taken place since the earlier collection ʻʻEnhancing Human Traitsʼʼ, edited in 1998 by Erik Parens; or-for lack of new developments-is there a shift of focus in the debate? Actually, upon a second read, the Parens collection seems to already identify all the crucial topics and mentions most arguments found in the new books. There are certainly some new techniques that serve as illustrative examples, techniques which were absent some ten years ago, but generally speaking, there is no substantial change. This is not meant as a reproach against the two new collections-nor is it a special praise for the earlier volume, which itself relies on older debates mentioned earlier-, it rather shows that the important and far reaching aspects of the debate lie beyond the current hot issues of how to stimulate a certain brain region, or which psychopharmaceutic substance brings about a specific desired super mental capacity. It is the old philosophical question of what it means to be a human being, which is raised emphatically by the possibility to alter our life form. 
